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Financial Services in the United States and United 
Kingdom: Comparative Approaches to Securities 
Regulation and Dispute Resolution 
Cory Alpert* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In global financial markets, the variety of complex financial 
instruments and investment strategies offered to investors creates the 
potential for highly technical and sophisticated disputes. Dispute 
resolution mechanisms in two of the world’s major financial centers, 
New York and London, reflect distinct approaches to handling 
customer complaints against providers of financial services. In the 
United States, the dominant forum for dispute resolution between 
brokers and investors is binding arbitration, which requires 
customers to arbitrate securities law claims rather than sue in federal 
courts.1 In the United Kingdom, customers of regulated financial 
businesses often submit their claims to a financial ombudsman, an 
informal scheme that employs procedures quite unlike formal 
arbitration.2 Nevertheless, in both markets alternative dispute 
resolution options have shifted a large portion of the responsibility 
for private enforcement of securities law from the courts to the 
specialized entities that administer them. 
This Article describes the regulatory background and dispute 
resolution schemes for financial services in the United States and the 
United Kingdom, with emphasis on procedural differences and 
allocation of forum choice between investors and firms. In its 
comparison of the United Kingdom’s system with recent trends in 
U.S. dispute resolution, this Article highlights advantages and 
disadvantages to firms and customers. In conclusion, this Article 
suggests that modifying the United States’ system to emphasize 
mediation would create a more efficient, inexpensive, and equitable 
method of resolving customer disputes. 
 
* Associate, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, & Flom  LLP; J.D., Boston University; 
B.A., University of California, Berkeley. 
 1. Stefano E. Cirielli, Arbitration, Financial Markets and Banking Disputes, 14 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 243, 274 (2003). 
 2. See About the Financial Ombudsman Service, http://www.financial-
ombudsman.org.uk/about/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
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II. FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
UNITED KINGDOM 
A basic knowledge of financial services regulation is necessary to 
understand the dispute resolution process for securities transactions. 
This Part provides an overview of financial services regulation in the 
United States and the United Kingdom. 
A. United States 
In the United States, the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)3 
and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)4 
provide the statutory framework governing securities transactions. 
Congress passed these laws in response to the serious abuses and 
fraud perpetrated on the financial markets that led to the October 
1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression. To boost 
investor confidence and prevent future market collapses, these Acts 
created affirmative disclosure requirements aimed at increasing 
market transparency and policing security issuers and broker-dealers.5 
The Securities Act regulates the primary market—direct sales 
from issuers—and requires issuers to register every offer or sale of a 
security in the United States, except for certain exempted 
transactions.6 The Exchange Act established the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC).7 The SEC regulates the secondary 
trading of securities between persons generally unaffiliated with the 
issuer and requires all publicly traded companies to make periodic 
disclosures. The broad coverage of the Exchange Act also governs 
securities exchanges, over-the-counter markets, broker-dealers, and 
securities associations.8 Firms, exchanges, associations, and 
individuals must register with the SEC and, where applicable, a self-
regulatory organization (SRO).9 According to section 6 of the 
Exchange Act, the National Association of Securities Dealers 
 
 3. 15 U.S.C. § 77a–77aa (2000). 
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 78a–78mm (2000). 
 5. Id. § 2. 
 6.  See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 3–5, 12. 
 7. Id. § 4. 
 8. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., JOEL SELIGMAN & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES 
REGULATION 52 (Thompson/West, 10th ed. 2007). See also Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934 §§ 2, 6. 
 9. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 5, 6 (securities exchanges); § 15 (broker-
dealers); § 15A (securities associations), § 19 (SROs). 
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(NASD), an SRO created to regulate broker-dealers,10 and the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), a National Securities Exchange (NSE) 
must have rules “designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative 
acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of free 
trade . . . and in general to protect investors and the public 
interest.”11 
To ensure proper governance and legal compliance, broker-
dealers must register with an SRO before transacting in securities12 
or participating in a securities exchange. As a result, large broker-
dealers are subject to the duplicative jurisdiction of multiple SROs 
and the overarching disciplinary authority of the SEC.13 After both 
the NYSE and NASD became publicly held corporations, the move 
towards creating a single self-regulatory body gained momentum.14 
Consequentially, in July 2007, consolidation of the NASD and the 
member regulation, enforcement, and arbitration functions of the 
NYSE resulted in the creation of the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority (FINRA).15 FINRA is the largest non-government 
regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States.16 
Like its predecessors, FINRA is an SRO subject to SEC oversight.17 
A key to achieving transparency in the financial markets is 
effective enforcement of securities laws. The SEC focuses on anti-
fraud enforcement, whereas FINRA deals with matters of negligence 
and unprofessional conduct falling short of fraud.18 FINRA Dispute 
Resolution (FINRADR) investigates complaints against brokerage 
 
 10. Id. § 15A; COFFEE, JR. ET AL., supra note 8, at 640. The label “broker” refers to 
any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of 
others, while the label “dealer” refers to any person engaged in the business of buying and 
selling securities for such person’s own account through a broker or otherwise. Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4)–(5). 
 11. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 6. 
 12. COFFEE, JR. ET AL., supra note 8, at 58 (“Under § 15(b)(8)–(9) a broker-dealer 
may not effect securities transaction [sic] unless it is a member of a registered securities 
association (i.e. NASD), unless it limits its activities to a stock exchange of which it is a 
member. This effectively ensures that virtually every broker-dealer must join the NASD and 
comply with its rules; suspension or expulsion by the NASD as a practical matter means 
disbarment from the industry.”). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See id. at 641–42. 
 15. About FINRA, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/index.htm (last visited Jan. 
30, 2009). 
 16. Id. 
 17. George H. Friedman, Update on NASD Dispute Resolution Activities, 1553 
PLI/Corp 69, 71 (2006). 
 18. COFFEE, JR. ET AL., supra note 8, at 641. 
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firms and their employees. It conducts enforcement actions against 
parties and individuals who violate statutory provisions or SEC or 
FINRA rules.19 Disciplinary actions can lead to fines, suspensions, 
expulsion from the securities industry, or referral to the SEC or 
federal or state enforcement agencies.20 FINRA finances its activities 
with industry dues, allowing for a large enforcement budget for 
industry surveillance and monitoring.21 
B. United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom embarked on the modernization and 
consolidation of its financial services regulatory scheme in 1986, 
when the London Stock Exchange first welcomed international 
financial services firms to the marketplace22 and Parliament passed 
the Financial Services Act (FSA 1986).23 The new regulations sought 
to boost investor confidence by broadening disclosure, improving 
business practices, and efficiently discovering and sanctioning 
securities law violators.24 FSA 1986 created three levels of authority 
to regulate the financial services industry.25 The first and highest level 
of authority is a governmental body called the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI).26 DTI transferred primary regulatory 
responsibility to the second level, a non-governmental regulatory 
body called the Securities and Investments Board (SIB).27 The SIB 
developed a framework of rules and regulations and granted 
recognition to SROs and certain professional bodies, the third level 
of regulatory authority,28 which directly monitored the activities of 
 
 19. Id. at 58. 
 20. FINRA, Investor Complaint Program: What to do When Problems Arise 1 (2007), 
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/inv_info/documents/investor_information/p011944.pd
f  [hereinafter FINRA Investor Brochure]. 
 21. COFFEE, JR. ET AL., supra note 8, at 57. 
 22. James J. Fishman, Enforcement of Securities Laws Violations in the United Kingdom, 
9 INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 131, 132 (1991). 
 23. Id. (stating that FSA 1986 came into force on April 29, 1988). 
 24. Id. at 133. 
 25. Id. at 134. 
 26. In 2007, DTI became the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform. See The Department of Trade and Industry (1983-2007), http://www.berr.gov.uk/ 
aboutus/corporate/history/outlines/DTI-1983-onwards/page13934.html (last visited Jan. 
30, 2009). 
 27. Fishman, supra note 22, at 134. 
 28. Robert W. Helm & Kevin K. Babikian, Creating, Managing and Distributing 
Offshore Investment Products: A Legal Perspective, 1529 PLI/CORP. 675, 848 (2006). 
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their members, the financial services firms.29 In 1997, the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) replaced the SIB as Parliament considered 
further financial services legislation.30 
In the period from 2000 to 2001, a newly developed legal 
framework replaced much of the pre-existing financial services 
legislation, including FSA 1986. This new framework, known as the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000), now 
governs the conduct of investment business by firms and 
individuals.31 FSMA 2000 consolidated regulatory power from the 
existing business regulators into the existing FSA.32 The FSA is 
responsible for enforcing FSMA 2000 legislation relating to 
investment business.33 The FSA’s four statutory objectives include: 
(1) maintaining market confidence, (2) promoting public awareness, 
(3) protecting consumers, and (4) reducing financial crime.34 Like 
FSA 1986,35 FSMA 2000 delegates power to the FSA to promulgate 
secondary legislation regulating many important details.36 The FSA 
Handbook contains promulgated FSA rules and regulations.37 
Although FSMA 2000 outlines the functions and regulatory 
objectives of the FSA,38 the FSA is “operationally independent of the 
government and funded entirely by the firms it regulates.”39 
 
 29. Fishman, supra note 22, at 134–35. 
 30. Helm & Babikian, supra note 28, at 849. 
 31. Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor, United Kingdom and United States 
Responses to the Regulatory Challenges of Modern Financial Markets, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 317, 
330 (2003). 
 32. The existing regulators consolidated into FSA under FSMA 2000 were the Building 
Societies Commission, the Friendly Societies Commission, the Investment Management 
Regulatory Organization, the Personal Investment Authority, the Register of Friendly 
Societies, and the Securities and Futures Authority. FSA had also assumed responsibility for 
banking supervision from the Bank of England and U.K. Listing Authority from the London 
Stock Exchange. FSA later assumed responsibility for mortgage regulation and general 
insurance business regulation. FSA History, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Who/ 
History/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
 33. Schooner & Taylor, supra note 31, at 331. 
 34. Id. at 332; Press Release, FSA, FSA’s New Investment Rules Come Into Force 
(Nov. 1, 2007), available at  http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/ 
2007/111.shtml. 
 35. Thomas J. Pack, International Trade: Regulation of London’s Financial Markets—
The Financial Services Act, 1986, 28 HARV. INT’L L.J. 196, 200 (1987). 
 36. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8, Part I, § 1 (U.K.). 
 37. FSA Handbook, http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/ (last visited Jan. 
30, 2009). 
 38. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c.8, Part I, § 2 (functions), §§ 3–6 
(Objectives) (U.K.). 
 39. FSA, Who Are We, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/Who/index.shtml (last 
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III. COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
The approaches for resolving financial services industry disputes 
within the United Kingdom and the United States differ greatly. In 
the wake of the Securities and Exchange Acts of the 1930s, the U.S. 
dispute resolution mechanism developed from litigation to binding 
arbitration. Ironically, modern U.S. arbitration—with its increased 
formalities and legalities—has come to more closely resemble 
litigation. Conversely, the United Kingdom employs an informal 
approach, lacking many of the constricting legalities found in the 
U.S. system. 
A. United States -- Binding Arbitration and the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority 
Broker-dealers, acting as personal advisors, salespersons and 
purchasers of securities, engage in significant levels of direct 
interaction with the investing public and each other. Due to the 
frequency, highly personal nature, and element of investor risk 
involved, these interactions tend to give rise to many private 
complaints. Until the late 1980s, defrauded or otherwise injured 
investors were able to sue their broker-dealers in U.S. courts for 
damages.40 Following several Supreme Court decisions enforcing 
arbitration agreements, arbitration clauses are now standard in most 
customer agreements, compelling parties to arbitrate rather than 
litigate. 
1. History of securities arbitration 
Through the late 1980s, U.S. investors could and often did sue 
their broker-dealers when high-risk investments produced 
disappointing results. This threat of private enforcement encouraged 
broker-dealers to self-police their activities. Some statutory 
provisions and SEC regulations provided explicit or implied private 
causes of action for investors.41 Provisions in both the Securities Act42 
 
visited Jan. 30, 2008). The FSA is a company limited by guarantee, an alternative type of 
corporation used primarily for non-profit organizations that require legal personality. Helm & 
Babikian, supra note 28, at 851; FSA, supra note 39. 
 40. See COFFEE, JR. ET AL., supra note 8, at 1139. 
 41. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729–30 (1975) 
(discussing history and overwhelming consensus that an implied private right of action exists 
under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5). 
 42. Securities Act of 1933 § 14. 
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and the Exchange Act43 state “[a]ny condition, stipulation, or 
provision binding any person . . . to waive compliance with any 
provision of [this statute or any rule or regulations thereunder] shall 
be void.”44 In 1953, the United States Supreme Court in Wilko v. 
Swan45 held that an agreement to arbitrate was a “stipulation” and 
that “the right to select the judicial forum is the kind of ‘provision’ 
that cannot be waived” under the Securities Act.46 Therefore, an 
arbitration clause did not bar the security buyer from seeking a 
judicial remedy.47 
However, the Wilko decision was “not easily reconcilable” with 
the legislative policy underlying the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),48 
which supported the enforcement of arbitration agreements as a 
means of securing a “prompt, economical and adequate solution of 
controversies.”49 The Supreme Court confronted this policy conflict 
in 1974 when it held in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. that a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement was enforceable in a suit alleging a 
violation of §10(b) of the Exchange Act.50 The Court held that the 
purchaser-seller agreement to arbitrate any dispute arising out of the 
transaction was valid and enforceable by the federal courts pursuant 
to the FAA.51 The Court distinguished Scherk from Wilko on its facts 
as Scherk dealt with an international contract where an opposing 
party might utilize foreign courts to “block or hinder access to the 
American court of the purchaser’s choice.”52 
In 1977, the SEC helped establish the Securities Industry 
Conference on Arbitration (SICA)—composed of various 
representatives of SROs, the Securities Industry Association (SIA), 
and the public—in order to suggest and promulgate improvements 
for investor dispute resolution by means of arbitration.53 SICA 
 
 43. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 29(a). 
 44. Securities Act of 1933 § 14. 
 45. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
 46. Id. at 434–35; see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 512 (1974) 
(quoting Wilko). 
 47. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434–38; see also Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510 (describing the Wilko 
Court’s holding). 
 48. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438; see also The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–
14 (2008). 
 49. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438. 
 50. 417 U.S. at 509 (alleging fraudulent representations concerning the status of 
trademark rights). 
 51. Id. at 519–20. 
 52. Id. at 518. 
 53. Constantine N. Katsoris, Roadmap to Securities ADR, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
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developed a uniform code of arbitration procedures adopted by 
participating SROs in 1979 and 1980.54 Following the efforts of 
SICA and the SROs, courts began to change their perception of 
arbitration as a fair and efficient option for investor disputes. In the 
late 1980s, a series of Supreme Court decisions favored the 
enforcement of arbitration clauses in areas previously considered 
non-arbitrable because of statutory interpretation.55 These decisions 
interpreted the FAA as a congressional mandate against judicial 
hostility to arbitration agreements.56 
In 1987, Shearson/American Express Inc. et al. v. McMahon et al. 
addressed the arbitrability of financial services disputes.57 The 
Supreme Court held that investors who had signed pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses could be compelled to arbitrate their Exchange 
Act claims arising from a domestic transaction, and that arbitration 
provides investors with adequate protection of their rights.58 
Moreover, in 1989, the Court overturned Wilko regarding the 
arbitrability of securities law disputes,59 and enforced an agreement 
to arbitrate claims arising under the Securities Act in Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.60 
Since then, broker-dealer firms have generally included pre-
dispute arbitration clauses in their standard customer agreements, 
binding both sides to arbitrate disputes relating to or arising out of 
future business activities. The FAA and many similar statutes enacted 
by the states recognize these agreements as binding and provide for 
their enforcement.61 Unless circumstances suggest that the 
arbitration agreement was procured by fraud or that the firm has 
waived its right to arbitration, compulsory arbitration is required to 
resolve investor disputes.62 “Arbitrations are conducted in 
accordance with the Uniform Code of Arbitration as developed by 
 
FIN. L. 413, 420–21 (2006). 
 54. Id. at 422. 
 55. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. 
Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 
U.S. 614 (1985); Sonatrach v. Distrigas Corp., 80 B.R. 606 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987). 
 56. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 225 (quoting Scherk). 
 57. Id. at 220. 
 58. See id. at 233. 
 59. COFFEE, JR. ET AL., supra note 8, at 1139. 
 60. Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 477. 
 61. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (2008). 
 62. See id. § 2. 
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the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA) and the 
rules of the sponsoring organization where the claim is filed.”63 
After MacMahon, the SEC sought to reform SICA arbitration 
procedures (and thereby those of the SROs), suggesting and 
approving rules that mandated evidentiary hearings and discovery 
processes, and required arbitrators to apply the law in reaching their 
decisions.64 In justifying mandatory arbitration of customer 
complaints arising under the federal securities laws, the Supreme 
Court in MacMahon referenced the SEC’s “expansive power to 
ensure adequacy of the arbitration procedures employed by the 
SROs.”65 The SEC, however, currently dedicates few resources to 
the oversight of securities arbitration, and as a result, self-interested 
SROs have revised the rules with little regulatory interference.66 The 
most notable SRO revisions come from FINRA, which often 
proposes and adopts its own arbitration rules and introduces 
formalized procedures. These procedures are not embraced in the 
Uniform Rules, which are mainly derived from SEC 
recommendations and promulgated by the SICA.67 
2. Current system of securities arbitration 
FINRA administers “the largest [U.S.] dispute resolution forum 
for investors and registered firms.”68 FINRA Dispute Resolution 
(FINRADR) provides both mediation and arbitration, and suggests, 
but does not require, that an aggrieved investor first attempt to 
resolve the conflict with the brokerage firm’s management.69 The 
FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedures for Customer Disputes 
(FINRA Code) applies to any dispute between a customer and a 
 
 63. FINRA Arbitration Procedures, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/ 
Parties/Overview/ArbitrationProcedures/index.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
 64. Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The Role of Law in 
Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1000 (2002). 
 65. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233 (1987); see also Jill I. 
Gross, Securities Mediation, Dispute Resolution for the Individual Investor, 21 OH. S. J. D. R. 
329, 346 (2006) (quoting McMahon). 
 66. Margaret Jacobs, SEC Faces Criticism for Role in the Oversight of Arbitration, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 15, 1995, at C1. 
 67. See Katsoris, supra note 53, at 466. An SRO may propose a new rule by sending a § 
19(b) (of the Exchange Act) filing to the SEC. 
 68. FINRA, About the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, http://www.finra.org/ 
AboutFINRA/index.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
 69. FINRA, Tour of the Dispute Resolution Process, http://www.finra.org/ 
ArbitrationMediation/Parties/Overview/OverviewOfDisputeResolutionProcess/index.htm 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2009) [hereinafter FINRADR Tour]. 
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“member” that is submitted to arbitration.70 Members include any 
broker, dealer, or associated person admitted to NASD (now 
FINRA).71 Under the FINRA Code, customers and members decide 
whether to arbitrate when a dispute arises.72 Brokerage customers are 
only compelled to arbitrate claims against their financial service 
providers if they are subject to a pre-dispute arbitration clause.73 
Under FINRA rules, members of FINRA are always bound to 
arbitration if their customer so chooses.74 
An investor seeking to recover money or securities will most 
likely be bound to pursue a remedy through FINRADR, as FINRA 
exercises jurisdiction over the vast majority of brokerage firms.75 
Likewise, FINRADR handles virtually all securities arbitration claims 
filed by its customers, including “unsuitable recommendations, 
breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, churning, and failure to supervise.”76 
Arbitration claims filed with FINRA are primarily resolved through 
negotiation or mediation settlements77 that compensate the claimant 
more than seventy percent of the time.78 FINRADR charges 
claimants a non-refundable filing fee for handling the arbitration in 
addition to a hearing session deposit. It also recommends that 
investors engage an attorney for mediation and arbitration, since in 
most cases the brokerage firm will have retained counsel.79 
Once an investor is compelled to arbitrate a claim, the modern 
process is akin to litigation with only slight variation. Arbitration, 
despite being touted as a “quick, fair, and relatively inexpensive” 
alternative to litigation, employs similarly formal procedures that 
increase costs and cause delays. 80 First, the complainant files an initial 
 
 70. FINRA Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes, R. 12101(a) (2008), 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=6077 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2009) [hereinafter FINRA Code]. 
 71. Id. R. 12100(o). 
 72. Id. R. 12201. 
 73. Id. R. 12200. 
 74. Id. R. 12101(a). 
 75. FINRA Investor Brochure, supra note 20, at 3. However, FINRA does not govern 
investment advisers, transfer agents, mutual funds, and public companies, which are subject to 
SEC and state securities regulators. 
 76. FINRA Dispute Resolution Fact Sheet, http://www.finra.org/ 
ArbitrationMediation/AboutFINRADR/Overview/FactSheet/index.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 
2009) [hereinafter FINRADR Fact Sheet]. 
 77. FINRADR Tour, supra note 69. 
 78. FINRA Investor Brochure, supra note 20, at 11. 
 79. Id. 
 80. The Arbitrator’s Manual 1 (2007) http://www.finra.org/web/groups/ 
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statement of claim with the Director of Dispute Resolution, 
“specifying the relevant facts and remedies requested.”81 The 
respondent then serves an answer including relevant facts, available 
defenses and any counterclaims.82 A panel, usually consisting of three 
arbitrators, is appointed to consider the initial statement of claim and 
all responsive pleadings.83 All panel members are chosen from a 
FINRA-maintained roster comprised of public, non-public, and 
eligible chairperson arbitrators.84 In customer disputes, chairpersons 
must be public arbitrators with special qualifications.85 Similar to 
litigation, the parties are subject to a discovery process86 including 
depositions,87 motion hearings on disputed collateral matters,88 and 
possible sanctions for failure to comply with any of the FINRA Code 
requirements.89 The parties produce witnesses and the arbitrators 
have the authority to issue subpoenas where necessary to compel 
production of documents or persons to appear.90 Except in certain 
circumstances, parties present their evidence in the form of testimony 
and documents in a litigation-like hearing before the arbitral panel.91 
Unlike litigation, however, evidence is admissible notwithstanding 
state or federal evidence rules,92 although witnesses must testify 
under oath or affirmation.93 If the parties proceed to an award, the 
FINRA Code requires that a majority of arbitrators agree on rulings 
and determinations,94 but does not require written opinions.95 
“Awards are subject to judicial review on the merits” only for 
 
ArbitrationMediation/@arbmed/@neutrl/documents/ArbMed/P009668.pdf (last visited Jan. 
30, 2009). 
 81. FINRA Code, supra note 70, R. 12302. 
 82. Id. R. 12303. 
 83. Id. R. 123401. The panel for claims of $25,000 or less consists of one arbitrator. 
For claims of more than $50,000 the panel may consist of three arbitrators unless otherwise 
requested by both parties. For claims between $25,000 and $50,000, any party may request 
three arbitrators instead of one. 
 84. Id. R. 12400(b). 
 85. Id. R. 12400(c). 
 86. Id. R. 12505. 
 87. Id. R. 12510. 
 88. Id. R. 12503. 
 89. Id. R. 8310. 
 90. Id. R. 12512. 
 91. See id. pts. V & VI. 
 92. Id. R. 12604. 
 93. Id. R. 12605. 
 94. Id. R. 12414. 
 95. Id. R.12904(f) (“The award may contain a rationale underlying the award.”). 
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“manifest disregard” of the law and “do not serve as precedent.”96 
This limited judicial review and absence of a required reasoned 
opinion allows arbitrators to base awards in favor of claimants on 
“general equity grounds.”97 
B. United Kingdom -- Optional Ombudsman and the Financial 
Ombudsman Service 
In the United Kingdom, the dispute resolution mechanism 
differs vastly from that of the United States. In addition to creating 
the newly consolidated authority of the FSA, FSMA 2000 replaced 
all previous dispute resolution schemes operating in the financial 
services, banking, and insurance sectors with the Financial 
Ombudsman Service (FOS). The FOS is a single, compulsory 
ombudsman scheme for the resolution of disputes between members 
of the public and “authorized persons.”98 
Because U.S. courts must consider both the Securities Act and 
the Exchange Act with respect to arbitration, they encounter issues 
of conflicting legislative policy. FMSA 2000 sidestepped these issues 
by providing for its own specially tailored dispute resolution scheme. 
Established by Part XVI of FSMA 2000, the ombudsman scheme 
aims to provide quick and informal resolution to financial disputes. It 
is free to complainants and does not require legal representation.99 
This scheme is available prior to arbitration or litigation, and thus 
causes no friction with the U.K.’s Arbitration Act 1996, which 
provides as a general principle that “parties should be free to agree 
how their disputes are resolved, subject only to such safeguards as are 
necessary in the public interest.”100 
In the instance where a customer brings the claim to the FOS, 
the ultimate decision is binding to authorized persons or firms 
subject to compulsory jurisdiction.101 While the FSA established the 
 
 96. Black & Gross, supra note 64, at 992. 
 97. Katsoris, supra note 53, at 459–60. 
 98. Part XVI of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 describes the Ombudsman 
Scheme. See Explanatory Notes to FSMA, http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/en2000/ 
2000en08.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2008) [hereinafter FSMA Explanatory Notes]. Authorized 
persons include a person who has permission under Part IV to carry on one or more regulated 
activities. If a firm has permission, it is authorized to carry on the regulated activities concerned 
in the name of the firm. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 §§ 31–32. 
 99. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 § 225(1). 
 100. Arbitration Act 1996, ch. 23, pt. I, § 1. 
 101. FSMA 2000 § 226 requires authorized firms to submit to the jurisdiction of the 
scheme. FSMA Explanatory Notes, supra note 98. 
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requirements of FOS compulsory jurisdiction, the FOS specifies 
voluntary jurisdiction subject to FSA approval.102 This procedure 
allows firms to contractually agree to resolve disputes through the 
ombudsman scheme, even if they are not “authorized firms” or if the 
disputed activities are beyond the scope of the compulsory 
jurisdiction.103 However, the firm’s activities must be subject, or 
potentially subject, to the compulsory jurisdiction rules.104 
The FOS dispute resolution system is designed to be free and 
accessible to complainants.105 Accordingly, it funds itself through 
levies and case fees required of member businesses.106 The levy 
applies only to regulated businesses and varies with the size of the 
business. Businesses subject to complaints are obligated to pay an 
“individual case fee” when a complaint becomes “chargeable.”107 
Because businesses fund the FOS, investors do not pay a fee for the 
resolution of their claims. 
However, investors face several jurisdictional hurdles. The FOS is 
available only to investors who have been unable to resolve their 
complaint after exhausting the internal complaint-handling 
mechanism of their lender, bank, insurer, adviser, or investment 
firm.108 To ensure that customers meet this requirement, firms must 
have complaint-handling procedures that comply with minimum 
standards specified in the FSA Handbook.109 These procedures 
require the firm to issue a “final response” to the investor, either 
accepting or rejecting the complaint, potentially offering some form 
 
 102. FSMA 2000 § 227 sets out voluntary jurisdiction. For further discussion, see also 
Rhoda James & Phillip Morris, The New Financial Ombudsman Service in the United 
Kingdom: Has the Second Generation Got it Right?, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
CONSUMERS’ ACCESS TO JUSTICE, 182 (Charles E.F. Rickett & Thomas G.W. Telfer eds., 
Cambridge University Press 2003). 
 103. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 § 227. 
 104. Id. § 227(4). 
 105. Rhoda James, The New Dispute Resolution System in the U.K. Financial Services 
Industry, J. INT’L FIN MKTI.F.M 2002, 4(6), 191, 191 (2002). 
 106. Financial Ombudsman Service, A Quick Guide to. . . Funding and Case Fees, 
http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/technical_notes/QG1.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Guide to Funding]. 
 107. Id. A case is ‘chargeable’ when it passes the initial stage of complaint review. 
Currently, businesses are only charged these fees for the third and subsequent complaints in a 
year. http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/faq/answers/research_a5.html (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2009). It appears that firms under voluntary jurisdiction also pay individual case fees. 
Id. 
 108. James & Morris, supra note 102, at 177. 
 109. Id. The newly revised dispute handling rules are available online at 
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/DISP (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 5 
88 
of settlement or explanation, and notifying the customer of his rights 
if he is dissatisfied.110 Customers may not bring claims to the FOS 
unless they have received the “final response”111 or, in the absence of 
a response, until eight weeks pass after filing the complaint.112 
Consumers who receive an early “final response” from a firm or 
pass the full waiting period may face other “time bar” jurisdictional 
hurdles that must be satisfied before the FOS may consider the 
merits of a complaint.113 Time limits for referral of complaints to the 
FOS bar the consumer from addressing the ombudsman more than 
six months after the consumer receives the firm’s final response, or 
more than six years after the event from which the complaint arises, 
except in exceptional circumstances.114  For example, if the customer 
was unaware of the grounds for the complaint, the ombudsman may 
hear their case within three years after the investor became, or should 
reasonably have become, aware of those grounds.115 
For customers whose complaints are within FOS jurisdiction, the 
FOS is a inexpensive alternative that is far less formal than litigation 
or arbitration. Once the FOS accepts a complaint, an investigation 
ensues. If the ombudsman believes that mediation may be more 
appropriate for resolving the complaint, he may initiate negotiation 
of a settlement between the parties at the earliest possible stage.116 If 
investigation seems necessary, the ombudsman gives both parties the 
opportunity to make written submissions. The parties then receive a 
provisional assessment setting out the ombudsman’s reasons and 
establishing a time limit within which the parties must respond.117 If 
either party objects to the provisional assessment within the time 
 
 110. See FSA Handbook, Glossary Definition of Final Response, 
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/glossary-html/handbook/Glossary/F?definition=G411 (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
 111. “Customers” include certain types of small businesses and charities as well. James, 
supra note 105. 
 112. FSA Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 2.8.1 R; see also FSMA 2000 § 226 (setting 
the circumstances in which a complaint can be dealt with: namely, that the complainant meets 
the relevant eligibility criteria, set by the Authority, and has asked the ombudsman to consider 
the case). FSMA Explanatory Notes, supra note 98. 
 113. FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE ANNUAL REVIEW 2006/2007,  at 44  (2007), 
available at http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ar07/index.html (follow 
“annual review 2006/07 - PDF version [opens in new window]” hyperlink)  [hereinafter 
Annual Review 2007]. 
 114. FSA Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 2.8.2 R8. 
 115. Id. at 2.8.2(2)(b). 
 116. Id. at 3.5.1 R. 
 117. Id. at 3.5.4. 
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limit, the ombudsman proceeds to determination.118 There is no 
hearing unless the ombudsman finds it necessary to determine the 
complaint.119 However, based on the requirements of Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights,120 the FSA rules provide 
for a hearing in certain circumstances.121 To obtain a hearing, a party 
must make a written request expressing the issues it wishes to raise so 
that the ombudsman may consider whether the issues are material, 
whether a hearing should be held, and whether any hearing that 
takes place should be public or private.122 
After the final appeal stage, the ombudsman makes a ruling. A 
distinctive feature of the “ombudsman schemes is that decisions may 
be made on grounds of substantive fairness, which may in some cases 
override the legal rules.”123 FSMA requires the FOS to consider 
complaints in reference to what is “fair and reasonable in all the 
circumstances of the case.”124 In making decisions the FOS must take 
into account “the relevant law, regulations, regulators’ rules, 
guidance and standards, relevant codes of practice and, where 
appropriate, what he considers to have been good industry practice 
at the relevant time.”125 The ombudsman must make a written 
statement of his reasons for the decision, and must require the 
claimant to accept or reject the decision by a specified date.126 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 3.5.5. 
 120. European Convention on Human Rights, art. 6, ¶ 1, opened for signature Nov. 4, 
1950, Europ.T.S. No. 5. (“[I]n the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any 
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be 
pronounced publicly. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 121. See FSA Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 3.5.6 R, 3.5.7 G (“In deciding whether 
there should be a hearing and, if so, whether it should be in public or private, the Ombudsman 
will have regard to the provisions of the European Convention on Human rights.”). 
 122. Id. at 3.5.6 R. 
 123. James, supra note 105, at 192. The overriding criterion to be used in dispute 
resolution is for the ombudsman to do “what is, in his opinion, fair and reasonable in all the 
circumstances of the case.” Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, § 228(2); FSA 
Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 3.8.1 R., 3.6.1 R.; see also Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000, § 228(2); FSA Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 3.6.2 G (“Section 228 of the Act 
sets the ‘fair and reasonable’ test for the Compulsory Jurisdiction and the Consumer Credit 
Jurisdiction and DISP 3.6.1 R extends it to the Voluntary Jurisdiction.”). 
 124. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 § 228(2). 
 125. James, supra note 105, at 192; DISP. 3.8.1(2), 3.6.4. 
 126. See FSA Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 3.6.6 R; Bunney v. Burns Anderson 
PLC, [2007] EWHC 1240 (Ch.), ¶ 11 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/ 
EWHC/Ch/2007/1240.html. 
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Investors may choose not to accept any FOS decisions and may 
proceed to the courts if not satisfied.127 However, if the investor 
accepts the ombudsman’s decision, it is binding on both the 
customer and the business.128 Firms must then abide by the 
ombudsman’s decision and do not have the option of appeal.129 
Limited judicial review is available, but only with respect to the 
process leading up to the decision, and not to its substance. 
If favorable to the complainant, the decision may be either a 
monetary award130 or a direction.131 The ombudsman may not only 
award damages for actual and consequential financial loss, but may 
also grant compensation for pain and suffering, damage to 
reputation, distress, or inconvenience.132 However, aggregate 
damages are subject to a maximum limit of £100,000,133 
($147,643)134 including any amount owed under a direction.135 If 
the investor rejects a ruling that the firm treated the complaint fairly, 
he then must decide whether to drop the complaint, attempt to 
settle, or proceed with litigation or arbitration. If the customer 
accepts a favorable decision (that the firm treated the investor’s 
complaint unfairly), the firm must promptly pay the award or comply 
with the direction.136 Monetary awards and directions may be 
enforced through litigation137 to the extent of the £100,000 
monetary cap.138 
The FOS “aim[s] to give clear, jargon-free reasons for [their] 
 
 127. Vernon Everitt, Director, Retail Themes, FSA, Remarks at the British and Irish 
Ombudsman Association Conference: Regulators and the Ombudsman—The Critical Role of 
the Financial Ombudsman Service (Apr. 27, 2007) (transcript available at 
http://www.bioa.org.uk/docs/ RegulatorsOmbudsmanVernonEveritt.pdf). 
 128. Annual Review 2007, supra note 113, at ii. 
 129. Compulsory Jurisdiction, FSMA Explanatory Notes, supra note 98. 
 130. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 § 229(2). 
 131. Id. § 229(3). A direction is tantamount to an injunction. 
 132. FSA Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 3.7.2 R. 
 133. Id. at 3.7.4 R. The Ombudsman may recommend that the firm pays the balance of 
an award of an amount more than the maximum, but it is not enforceable and therefore firms 
are unlikely to pay that amount. See Bunney v. Burns Anderson PLC, [2007] EWHC 1240 
(Ch.), ¶ 11 (Eng.), available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2007/ 
1240.html. 
 134. As reported by xe.com on Nov. 21, 2008. 
 135. See Bunney, ¶ 68. 
 136. FSA Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 3.7.12 R. 
 137. Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, Schedule 17, ¶ 16 (Money Awards), § 
229(9) (Directions). 
 138. See Bunney, ¶ 68. 
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decisions” that the average customer can understand.139 The scheme 
accumulates informal precedents, which improve consistency and 
predictability for firms. Decisions are then published in divisional 
case digests.140 Because the ombudsman is not required to apply the 
law, but rather does what he considers fair and reasonable given the 
circumstances of the case, decisions rarely provide actual precedential 
value.141 These decisions, while available via the FOS website, do not 
disclose party identities.142 
IV. COMPARISON OF INVESTOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
MECHANISMS 
Comparing both the framework and forum choices of investor 
dispute resolution mechanisms reveals some contrast between the 
United Kingdom’s FOS and the United States’ FINRA Arbitration. 
Where the framework of the FOS allows for a rather collegial 
proceeding, FINRA Arbitration amounts to quasi-litigation. 
Similarly, forum choice in the FOS allows for multiple avenues of 
relief, whereas FINRA Arbitration allows for only limited grounds of 
appeal. 
A. Framework 
Compared to FINRA Arbitration, the FOS seems almost quaint 
as the scheme is designed to be inquisitorial rather than adversarial. 
Eschewing strict procedural rules, the FOS embraces a highly 
informal approach, exemplified by the lack of formal hearings or 
face-to-face cross-examinations.143 The ombudsman makes a decision 
based only on the prepared documents because in most cases there is 
no oral argument. The FOS asserts that because the ombudsmen 
“look at the facts of each complaint—not at how well people present 
their case . . . no one should need any special expertise or 
professional help in order to bring their complaint to [the FOS].”144 
 
 139. Financial Ombudsman Service, Our Aims and Values, http://www.financial-
ombudsman.org.uk/about/aims.htm  (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
 140. James, supra note 105, at 193. 
 141. See Bunney, ¶ 52. 
 142. Opinions and case studies are published in the Ombudsman News, a regular 
newsletter published by FOS and available at http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/ 
publications/ombudsman.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). Decisions use party names such as 
“AYZ Association” and “Firm CDE.” 
 143. Financial Ombudsman Service, supra note 139. 
 144. Id. 
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Conversely, FINRA strongly recommends legal representation for 
both mediation and arbitration. Brokerage firms in either system 
likely employ legal counsel to prepare their submissions. As a result, 
the FOS customer complainant may believe that he would be 
disadvantaged without professionally prepared documents, and 
therefore might hire legal counsel. Moreover, parties are responsible 
for their own costs,145 unless the ombudsman uses his discretion to 
award costs to prevailing parties.146 Thus, for many customers, the 
FOS is not actually cost-free, although it is less expensive than 
alternatives. 
The difference in cost between the FOS and FINRA directly 
affects the jurisdictional hurdles that filter filed cases. Under the FOS 
system, despite potential legal costs, there is still no fee-based cost 
deterrent for consumers pursuing claims against firms. Therefore, the 
time-bar and complaint-exhaustion jurisdictional hurdles act as a 
filter.147 Since FINRA complainants must pay an arbitration fee, a 
hearing deposit, and attorneys’ fees,148 cost-deterrence serves as a 
filter, making strict jurisdictional prerequisites for arbitration 
unnecessary. Consequently, the arbitration may proceed to 
consideration on the merits subject only to a six-year time limit and 
FINRA’s general regulatory jurisdiction.149 
With respect to the value of the award, the FOS maximum is 
£100,000. The rationale is that disputes involving larger sums 
warrant the cost of legal representation and those claims would 
proceed to litigation in the absence of the ombudsman.150 FINRA 
Arbitration has no statutory cap on the value of awards, but 
incorporates a small-claims procedure, by which it diverts claims for 
$25,000 or less to a Simplified Arbitration Procedure. Unless the 
customer requests a hearing, such claims are decided solely on the 
 
 145. See FSA Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 3.7.10. 
 146. Id. at 3.7.1 R. 
 147. See Financial Ombudsman Service, Annual Review 1006/2007, How We Dealt with 
the Complaints, http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ar07/dealt.html (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
 148. FINRA Code, supra note 70, R. 12900(a) (Customer Fees when Customer is 
Claimant), R. 12902(a) (Hearing Session Fees). 
 149. Id. R. 12206 (Time Limits). 
 150. FSA Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 3.7.4 R; see id. at 3.7.6 G.  Whether this 
upper limit is appropriate is an area of dispute between consumers and industry. Lord Hunt’s 
Review, Ch. 8, p. 69, http://www.thehuntreview.org.uk/updates/FOS_Report.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 30. 2009) (recommending further investigation and review to determine the 
probable effects of an increased limit). 
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parties’ written submissions, much like the FOS.151 
FINRA and FOS also differ in the manner in which they 
document opinions. While FINRA does not require written 
opinions, the ombudsman must provide a written statement of 
reasons.152 The substance of FINRA decisions is generally 
confidential. However, FINRADR publishes a summary of all awards 
and tracks award payments, permitting staff to initiate suspension 
proceedings against an industry party that fails to comply with an 
award.153 However, because the FOS is not a public authority subject 
to the U.K Freedom of Information Act, it may publish decisions, 
but must omit party names.154 Consequently, the FOS offers 
guidance to offending companies, but does not name them. 
Arguably, this may be disincentivize firms from initially settling 
disputes or from taking remedial measures because a poor record will 
not affect their reputation.155 However, statistics indicate that the 
FOS overcomes this difficulty and is more effective than FINRA 
Arbitration.156 Sixty-six percent of the cases submitted to FINRA in 
2007, were resolved by mediation or direct settlement,157 while the 
FOS resolved ninety-four percent of its cases by informal 
settlement.158 
 
 151. The arbitrator may request a hearing or require a party to submit additional 
documentation. When an arbitrator is deciding the case without a hearing, parties may ask to 
submit additional documents. FINRA, How Is Arbitration Begun? http://www.finra.org/ 
ArbitrationMediation/Parties/Overview/ArbitrationProcedures/P009536 (last visited Jan. 
30, 2009). 
 152. See FSA Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 3.6.6 R. 
 153. FINRADR Fact Sheet, supra note 76.  
 154. Financial Ombudsman Service, Freedom Of Information And Data Protection, 
http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/about/foi.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). The 
U.K. Freedom of Information Act 2000 grants a general right of access to information held by 
public authorities. Freedom of Information Act 2000 (c. 36) pt. 1, ¶ 1. 
 155. ADRNOW, Financial Ombudsman Service, http://www.adrnow.org.uk/go/ 
SubPage_33.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). In September 2007, the board of the FOS 
engaged Lord David Hunt to lead an independent review of the FOS and its relationship with 
external stakeholders. Financial Ombudsman Service, Openness and Accessibility,  
http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/news/updates/openness_accessibility.html. 
Among Lord Hunt’s potential uses for the results of his review is a company ranking based on 
complaints received or upheld, or both. Richard Dyson, Mail on Sunday (UK), Message to Mr. 
Silk (deceased): A Clumsy Request to a Bereaved Daughter shows Ombudsman’s Shortcomings but 
Change is on the Way, (Apr. 11, 2007), 2007 WLNR 21848312. 
 156. FINRA, DISPUTE RESOLUTION STATISTICS, http://www.finra.org/ 
ArbitrationMediation/AboutFINRADR/Statistics/index.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Annual Review 2007, supra note 113, at 1. 
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B. Forum Choice -- Fairness 
Both U.S. and U.K. customers can compel firms to submit to 
their respective dispute resolution mechanisms, but firms may 
preempt customers’ choice through pre-dispute arbitration clauses 
only in the United States. Since brokers use these clauses and U.S. 
courts enforce them, arbitration is the norm in the United States.159 
In the United Kingdom, the FOS provides customers with an 
indefeasible choice: if a regulated business will not settle the 
complaint initially, it cannot prevent the customer from invoking 
FOS jurisdiction through a contractual agreement.160 Furthermore, 
U.K. investors have a foolproof option: the FOS decision is binding 
on the company, but not on the customer.161 Therefore, the 
customer may pursue litigation or arbitration if he is dissatisfied with 
the outcome.162 
Although U.K. firms cannot compel customers to relinquish 
their statutory right to resolve disputes through the ombudsman, 
FOS jurisdiction encourages businesses to avoid resorting to its 
services.163 As established by the Complaints-Handling Rules of the 
FOS, each regulated business must follow a set response to the initial 
customer complaint geared towards the earliest possible 
resolution.164 Many companies opt to include arbitration or exclusive 
jurisdiction clauses in their contracts, but such agreements only take 
effect if the customer chooses to not use the ombudsman scheme or 
rejects an unsatisfactory award, or if the complaint fails on 
jurisdictional or substantive grounds.165 Even then, the 
arbitration clause may be void under the U.K.’s Unfair Contract 
Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations.166 These laws bar 
enforcement of unfair contract terms that the consumer did not 
negotiate, including arbitration clauses placed in standard customer 
agreements by brokerage firms. These clauses are widely upheld in 
 
 159. COFFEE, JR. ET AL., supra note 8, at 1139. 
 160. ADRNOW, supra note 155. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Firms that are subject to the compulsory or voluntary jurisdiction of the FOS are 
bound by the consumer’s decision to pursue a complaint with the Ombudsman. See supra 
notes 102–03. 
 164. See FSA Handbook, supra note 37, at DISP 1. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id.; see also The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, S.I. 1999, 
No. 2083 (UK). 
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the United States, where “a customer-broker arbitration clause is not 
per se unconscionable as a contract of adhesion, nor is an agreement 
to arbitrate in accordance with SEC approved procedures 
‘unconscionable as a matter of law.’”167 
With respect to fairness, the FOS and FINRA Arbitration 
produce disparate treatment of successful complainants, unsuccessful 
complainants, absolved firms, and censured firms. The FOS appears 
to be fair for complainants. Where the complaint is upheld in favor 
of the complainant (which happens in roughly one-third of the cases 
considered),168 the FOS aims to restore the complainant to the 
position he would have been in had he not been wronged.169 The 
FOS may award consequential damages in addition to damages for 
actual loss, or it may issue a direction. Furthermore, the ombudsman 
compelled to follow what is “fair and reasonable under all the 
circumstances,” not the law.170 This discretionary standard reflects 
the FSA’s “emphasis on more principles-based regulation” that 
focuses “on the outcomes that matter, rather than processes and 
procedures.”171 When a successful FOS complainant accepts a 
satisfactory award, he receives the benefit of finality because the firm 
may not appeal. An unsuccessful or unsatisfied complainant may also 
benefit from favorable treatment under the ombudsman scheme as 
he may choose to proceed in a judicial or arbitral forum.172 
The ombudsman scheme does not offer similar benefits for firms. 
Absolved firms remain subject to the unsuccessful customer’s lawsuit 
or arbitration, while censured firms face binding awards not 
necessarily based in law. The £100,000 cap on damages may offer 
these firms some solace, as will the overall cost savings of the FOS 
 
 167. Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 285–86 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(internal citation omitted); see also COFFEE, JR. ET AL., supra note 8, at 1143. 
 168. In 34% of cases, the ombudsman found the business had not treated the customer’s 
complaint fairly. ANNUAL REVIEW 2007, supra note 113. 
 169. Everitt Speech, supra note 127. 
 170. See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text. 
 171. Press Release, FSA, FSA’s New Investment Rules Come Into Force, (Nov. 1, 2007), 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2007/111.shtml (quoting FSA 
Director of Retail Policy Dan Waters) (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
 172. The United Kingdom offers many options for an arbitral forum, including the 
International Chamber of Commerce and the City Disputes Panel (CDP). The CDP was 
established in 1994 in London to provide specialist arbitration panels, Cirielli, supra note 1, at 
254, and provides “alternative dispute resolution services that are tailored to meet the needs of 
the financial services industry, in the UK and internationally.” CITY DISPUTES PANEL, 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, http://www.citydisputespanel.org/pages/home.asp 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
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system over alternative forums. 
FINRA Arbitration offers complainants and firms a standard of 
fairness judicially approved in the United States, as discussed in 
Section IIA. Arbitrators issue decisions, including injunctive orders 
or damage awards, which are final and binding on both parties with 
only limited grounds for appeal.173 For absolved firms and 
unsuccessful customers, this is the most important difference 
between FINRA Arbitration and the FOS. FINRA Arbitration offers 
finality benefits for either side when successful, permitting absolved 
firms to shield themselves from looming appeals. Unsuccessful 
complainants, however, are bound by decisions and may litigate their 
claims only under limited circumstances.174 FINRA Arbitration 
typically generates decisions based on the law chosen by firms to 
govern their standard customer agreements. Unlike the FOS system, 
customers using the FINRA system may see a disadvantage in the 
arbitrator’s lack of express authority to decide a dispute based on 
fairness in the circumstances. Because there is no requirement of a 
reasoned opinion and decisions are made by consensus, in some cases 
the arbitrators may issue awards that are motivated by principles of 
equity. 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
Following the MacMahon decision in the United States, changes 
to securities arbitration procedures have increasingly shifted the 
dispute resolution process closer to litigation.175 This shift towards 
litigation-type techniques has made more accessible alternatives 
necessary. The development of substitutes for the alternative dispute 
resolution scheme in the United States may be evidence that the 
current first-and-only resort mechanism is not the most efficient 
solution. 
Broker-dealers in the United States have long assumed that 
arbitration is the most attractive alternative to litigation because “it is 
devised as a prompt and inexpensive means of resolving complicated 
issues.”176 As that assumption no longer holds true, the United 
Kingdom’s success with the financial ombudsman scheme suggests a 
 
 173. COFFEE, JR. ET AL., supra note 8, at 1143. 
 174. FINRA, Arbitration Process, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/Parties/ 
ArbitrationProcess/index.htm  (last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
 175. See Katsoris, supra note 53, at 423; Black & Gross, supra note 64, at 992. 
 176. FINRA, supra note 174. 
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more cost-effective solution. The FOS covers a much larger 
spectrum of complaints than FINRA, and does so at a relatively 
lower cost to firms and at no cost to pro se consumers. 
The FINRA Mediation Program, which has developed as an 
extension of FINRA Arbitration,177 most closely mirrors the FOS 
scheme and offers an attractive alternative to arbitration in the 
United States. Parties to FINRA dispute resolution may agree to 
mediation at any point in the process. FINRA mediation’s overall 
settlement rate of investment disputes exceeds eighty percent.178 
With an emphasis on mediation, the U.S. system may begin to 
approximate the U.K. ombudsman system, at least with respect to 
disputes involving lesser sums. 
Mediation is a natural first step in dispute resolution, offering an 
informal, voluntary approach under which a mediator facilitates 
negotiations between parties.179 The mediator does not impose the 
solution, but rather “helps make it possible for the parties to craft 
and accept the solution themselves, swiftly and inexpensively.”180 The 
agreement reached is binding on the parties only if both sides accept 
it. The parties may lose the benefits of finality if they reject an 
agreement, but if parties accept an agreement, the result will likely be 
net positive. The mediator’s objective is to help the parties arrive at a 
mutually acceptable resolution, and therefore, a positive, cost-
effective result is likely.181 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The financial dispute resolution schemes available in the United 
States and United Kingdom provide differing approaches deriving 
from their distinct statutory, regulatory, and judicial histories. As 
cross-border securities offerings and global brokerage firms 
complexify and intertwine international securities markets, customer-
 
 177. FINRA Investor Brochure, supra note 20, at 3. 
 178. Id. at 11. 
 179. Id. at 10. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Of the 111,673 disputes FOS resolved in the April 2006-March 2007 financial year, 
104,831 cases were resolved by mediation, recommended settlements and adjudications, while 
only 6,842 cases were resolved by an ombudsman making a formal decision at the final appeal 
stage of the dispute resolution process. ANNUAL REVIEW 2007, supra note 113. Of the 5,000 
cases resolved by FINRADR in 2007, 3,291 were resolved by mediation or direct settlement 
and only 1,048 were decided by arbitrators. FINRA, Dispute Resolution Statistics, 
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/Statistics/index.htm 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2009). 
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broker disputes will become more frequent. In this environment, an 
emphasis on mediation-based resolution in the United States would 
provide a low-cost, less formal alternative to litigation, similar to that 
enjoyed under the FOS in the United Kingdom. 
